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STOP ME BEFORE I QUANTIFY AGAIN: THE
ROLE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE IN THE
STUDY OF ELECTION LAW
James A. Gardner*
I.

INTRODUCTION

One of the most striking recent developments in the academic
study of law is its increasingly interdisciplinary character. Historians, of course, have long found the legal academy a congenial home,
but these days scholars from what seems like every department on
the university campus have begun to descend, as it were, upon the
law and to stake claims to pieces of the field. Sociologists, statisticians, psychologists, economists, linguists, literary analysts of every
stripe, and even a few theoretical scientists have quite deliberately
begun to sally forth beyond the traditional boundaries of their disciplines and to bring their insights to the analysis of law. This trend is
understandable enough. Law is a discipline in which ideas can directly and powerfully affect the way real people live their lives, far
more so than in most other fields. Scholars who spend their careers
within the confines of their disciplines may influence one another
and few others. Those who make their pitch to a legal audience, in
contrast, may very well end up convincing a court or legislature to
put their ideas into practice in a way that most academics can only
dream about. At the same time, law itself has become more opentextured and self-reflective, making it more receptive to insights
from other disciplines. Increasingly, academics from other fields are
welcomed into the legal academy.
Among those making the trek to law are political scientists who,
in growing numbers, can be found offering their knowledge to lawyers, judges, legislators, and legal academics. Many legal scholars,
* Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law.
Thanks to Jay Mootz and Monte Piliawsky for comments on an earlier draft.
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moreover, have embraced political science as a legitimate source of
valuable insights and have folded into their scholarly agendas a
commitment to confront, and even in some cases to employ, the
methods and insights of contemporary political science. Not surprisingly, this trend is especially pronounced in the field of election
law. Indeed, political scientists seem to have a special claim to be
heard in this area. Election law involves, among other things, the
management of politics, a subject that political scientists seem to
"own" in ways that lawyers do not precisely because the study of
politics is the very essence of their field. A fruitful partnership between lawyers and political scientists has readily emerged on many
fronts. Some kinds of overtly political claims, for example, simply
cannot be mounted successfully without the assistance of a professional political scientist. It is impossible, for instance, to win a vote
dilution claim under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act' without expert testimony from a political scientist to establish the existence of
racial bloc voting.2 Other kinds of more traditional legal claims have
been applied in novel ways with the help of political science insights
and methodology. For example, courts have invoked principles of
equal protection to invalidate ballot placement schemes that place incumbents at the top of the ballot. 3 This abusive bit of incumbency
protection would still be in widespread use had not political scientists
formally demonstrated both the existence of the "donkey vote" and
4
its relevance to ballot placement.
Political science, however, is not always a polite guest at the legal table, graciously assisting its host in the management of legal
problems with political ramifications. On the contrary, some of political science's most significant findings sharply challenge fundamental assumptions of the American constitutional order. One of the
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1994).

2. See generally Thomburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) (describing the

factual finding necessary to meet plaintiffs burden).
3. See Graves v. McElderry, 946 F. Supp. 1569 (W.D. Okla. 1996);
McLain v. Meier, 637 F.2d 1159 (8th Cir. 1980); Bloomenthal v. Lavelle, 614
F.2d 1139 (7th Cir. 1980); Gould v. Grubb, 14 Cal. 3d 661, 536 P.2d 1337, 122

Cal. Rptr. 377 (1975).
4. A "donkey vote" is one in which voters are uninformed or indifferent

about any or all of the candidates running for a particular office. See Clough v.
Guzzi, 416 F. Supp. 1057, 1063 (D. Mass. 1976).
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mainstays of the constitutional regulation of politics, for example, is
the implicit assumption that citizens are fully capable of effective
self-government.5 This belief shows up in the Supreme Court's deep
hostility to government regulation of political speech, including
campaign finance regulation; its skepticism toward measures that
limit the public's choice of candidates, such as ballot access restrictions and term limits; and its preference for measures that increase
the amount of publicly available information, such as disclosure. Yet
one of the signal accomplishments of contemporary political science
is its powerful demonstration of the depth and breadth of voter irrationality.6 Another important strand that runs through American
constitutional thought from the Framers through the Progressives to
modem-day civic republicans is a neo-classical belief in the importance of good citizenship-including regular political participationto the development of individuals and the nation as a community.
Yet political scientists have shown convincingly that Americans do
not participate widely in politics and typically are grossly ignorant
concerning even the most pressing political issues of the day. As one
student of the subject has written, "[t]he typical American voter...
knows little about politics, is not interested in politics, does not participate in politics, does not organize his or her political attitudes in a
coherent7 manner, and does not think in structured, ideological
terms."
The most far-reaching challenges to the constitutional order,
however, come from rational choice theory8 and allied disciplines
which purport to cast doubt on the meaningfulness, indeed the very
possibility, of democracy itself. Through such insights as Arrow's
Impossibility Theorem,9 political scientists working in these fields
have powerfully challenged the basic coherence of such concepts as
5. See Daniel Ortiz, The Engaged and the Inert: Theorizing PoliticalPersonality under the FirstAmendment, 81 VA. L. REV. 1, 2 (1995).
6. See generally, ANGUS CAMPBELL, ET AL., THE AMERICAN VOTER

(1960).
7. ERIC R.A.N. SMITH, THE UNCHANGING AMERICAN VOTER 1-2 (1989).
8. See DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL
CHOICE THEORY: A CRITIQUE OF APPLICATIONS IN POLMCAL SCIENCE 1-12
(1994).
9. See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 2-3

(2nd ed. 1963).
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majority rule and legislative and adjudicative rationality-concepts
that fundamentally undergird our political, constitutional, and legal
order and ultimately legitimate the institutions of government. These
conclusions, moreover, seem to resonate with popular beliefs concerning the shortcomings of contemporary government and politics,
beliefs that seem to flow from a widely shared intuition that popular
0
self-government has somehow failed to live up to its own ideals.'
This juxtaposition of "good" and "bad" political science presents participants in the legal system with some difficult questions.
What kind of knowledge does political science offer law, and how
exactly can law make use of it? Is it possible to enjoy the fruits of
political science research selectively, either by picking and choosing
among empirical findings or by accepting empirical results without
also accepting the theoretical problems they raise? Or is it impossible to detach political science findings from the infrastructure-the
assumptions and methodology-that produces them? What indeed
are those who work within the legal system, and particularly within
the portion of the legal system devoted to creating and maintaining a
democratic regime, to make of political science work that casts doubt
upon the legitimacy and coherence of the very enterprise in which
they are engaged?
In this essay, I approach these questions by examining some of
the pitfalls associated with reliance on political science and by suggesting some ways to distinguish political science knowledge of a
kind on which the law may reasonably rely from that on which it
should not. My conclusion is modest. I argue, in brief, that political
science is useful to law when it helps law to determine the existence
of factual circumstances or conditions that, according to the law,
count as achievement or violation of a legally specified norm. In
contrast, political science is of far less utility when either the norm to
be assessed, or the set of facts and circumstances that are to be
counted as achievement or violation of the norm, are supplied by political science itself rather than by the law. The latter problem, unfortunately, taints a good deal of political science research, requiring
legal actors to approach it with some skepticism and with a clear
sense of its inherent limitations.
10. See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT 274-315 (1996).

June 1999]

STOP ME BEFOREI QUANTIFYAGAN1

1145

II. THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF POLITICS
Contemporary political science is, as its name declares, a "scientific" discipline. Its goals, methods, and assumptions are modeled
on those of the natural sciences. Like chemistry or physics, political
science aspires to understand its subject-human society and its
politics-as it truly is. Moreover, just as human understanding of the
natural world increases human welfare through scientific advances
and inventions, so advances in human understanding of social and
political phenomena will, it is hoped, yield equally beneficial results-keeping liberty secure, perhaps, or achieving and maintaining
world peace. These are lofty and unimpeachable goals, and political
science demands that they be pursued through methods that are rigorously scientific. Thus, political scientists must approach their
subject with the greatest possible objectivity and detachment, along
with a scientist's constitutional skepticism. They aspire to proceed
as much as possible through the collection of objective measurements of political phenomena and the objective analysis of the data
so collected. From such data, the political scientist constructs lawlike generalizations about the political world. These generalizations
may then be used to predict political phenomena, and the validity of
the model may then be tested empirically through subsequent experimentation.
This way of studying politics is a relatively recent arrival on the
intellectual scene, having emerged only since the Enlightenment."
For many centuries, the study of society and its politics was deemed
a philosophical enterprise.12 By the late eighteenth century, however, the natural sciences had begun to acquire such prestige, and to
justify their stature with such impressive performative successes, that
13
other disciplines came not only to admire but to emulate them.
Contemporary political science, like most of the social sciences, has
strong roots in this kind of emulation. 14 Political science also owes a
considerable debt to the discipline of economics, which was the first
of the social sciences to employ advanced scientific techniques such
11. See Leo Strauss, An Epilogue, in ESSAYS ON THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF
POLrrICS 309 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1962).
12. See id.
13. Seeid. at313.
14. See id. at314.
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15
as mathematical modeling and sophisticated quantitative analysis.
Political science's embrace of public choice theory, for example,16
seems to result not a little from a sort of economic equation envy.
By the middle of the twentieth century, the scientific method of
studying politics had become so well established that, as the political
philosopher Leo Strauss bitterly complained, "[i]t controls whole7 departments of political science in great and in large universities."'1
Despite its honorable aspirations, the scientific study of politics
raises some troubling difficulties. Indeed, some have challenged the
entire enterprise as deeply misguided. The major criticisms fall
roughly into four areas. First, some have criticized political science
for adopting a reductive and improperly limited conception of political knowledge. For example, in his characteristically gentle critique
of political science's grander aspirations, the late philosopher Isaiah
Berlin argued that political judgment was necessarily a kind of practical judgment based on knowledge that cannot easily be deemed scientific.' 8 Although scientific knowledge is often helpful, even in the
political world, sciences and theories
cannot be even a partial substitute for a perceptual gift, for a
capacity for taking in the total pattern of a human situation,
of the way in which things hang together-a talent to
which, the finer, the more uncannily acute it is, the power
of abstraction
and analysis seems alien, if not positively
19
hostile.
For Berlin, excellence in the political world, which he called
"statesmanship, ' 20 depended not on the systematic collection and
analysis of data in scientific ways but rather on a kind of "semiinstinctive knowledge" 2' that the scientific study of politics seems to
rule out of bounds.

15. See GREEN & SHAPIRO, supranote 8, at 1.

16. See BRIAN BARRY, SOCIOLOGISTS, ECONOMISTS & DEMOCRACY ch. 1
(1970).
17. Strauss, supranote 11, at 307.
18. See Isaiah Berlin, Political Judgment, in THE SENSE OF REALITY:
STUDIES IN IDEAS AND THEIR HISTORY 40 (Henry Hardy ed., 1996).
19. Id.at 50.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 51.
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Leo Strauss criticized the scientific view of political knowledge
on similar grounds. Striving self-consciously to be as scientific as
possible, political science proceeds, said Strauss, from the premise
that "only scientific knowledge is genuine knowledge. From this it
immediately follows that all awareness of political things that is not
scientific is cognitively worthless." 22 The old political science admitted that political facts are known independently of political science and thus made political science stand or fall "by the truth of the
pre-scientific awareness of political things." 23 In rejecting the possibility of pre-scientific political knowledge, Strauss argued, the new
political science "comes into being through an attempted break with
common sense." 24 This, according to Strauss, has had disastrous
consequences for the discipline:
The break with the common sense understanding of political things compels the new political science to abandon the
criteria of relevance that are inherent in political understanding. Hence, the new political science lacks orientation
regarding political things; it has no protection whatever, except by surreptitious recourse to common sense, against
losing itself in the study of irrelevancies.25
This is an observation with which former Senator William Proxmire,
who so enjoyed lampooning the triviality of some social science research, would surely have agreed.26
Another way to criticize the limited scope of political science's
conception of knowledge involves examining its methods. Because
it aspires to be scientific, political science seeks to apply itself to
objective data. But for data to be objective, it must be measurable.
Consequently, political science must confine itself to the analysis not
22. Strauss, supranote 11, at 313-14.
23. Id. at 315.
24. Id. at316.

25. Id. at318.
26. Senator William Proxmire bestowed his annual "Golden Fleece
Awards" upon the most egregious examples of wasteful government spending.
See Cliff Haas, Senate Maverick Proxmire to Retire, STAR-TRIB. (Minneapo-

lis-St. Paul), Aug. 28, 1987, at IA. A number of these awards have been conferred upon absurd-sounding social science research projects. See Peter Riesenberg, The Case Against Sociology: It Has An Attitude Problem, NEWSDAY,

Apr. 3, 1990, at 55.
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merely of "measurable phenomena," 27 but of phenomena that are
measurable by the tools of political science. Walter Berns, among
others, has severely criticized this limitation.28 In reviewing political
science studies that seek to determine why people vote the way they
do, Berns noted that the easiest way to collect this information would
be to ask voters directly. 29 The answers, however, would be subjective, unverifiable, and difficult to compare and quantify, which in
turn would make them too difficult to analyze using political science's tools of choice. The political scientist responds to this problem by asking different questions, questions that respondents "can,
and perhaps do, answer accurately (such as their age, sex, education,
religion, and voting choice)," and then reporting the answers "with
statistical exactitude." 30 The result, says Berns, is "the sacrifice of
political relevance on the altar of methodology. The questions asked
and pursued are determined by the
limits of the scientific method
31
matter.,
subject
the
by
rather than
The problem Berns identifies is pervasive in political science. It
is sometimes said, for example, that the most basic definition of
politics is well captured in Harold D. Lasswell's phrase: "Who Gets
What, When, How." 32 Yet it is hardly self-evident that "who gets
what" is the fundamental question to which the study of politics
should be addressed. Some of the greatest students of politics have
asked very different questions-questions concerning the nature of
the good life, the characteristics of the good citizen, the structure of
the best regime, the sources of political legitimacy, and so on. It is
quite clear, on the other hand, that Lasswell's definition of politics is
especially congenial to the scientific method, for "who gets what,

27. John Ferejohn, Rationality andInterpretation:ParliamentaryElections
in Early Stuart England, in THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO POLITICS: A
CRITICAL REASSESSMENT OF THE THEORY OF RATIONAL ACTION 279, 280
(Kristen Renwick Monroe ed., 1991).
28. See Walter Berns, Voting Studies, in ESSAYS ON THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY
OF POLITICS, supra note 11, at 55.

29. See id.
30. Id.
31. Id.

32. HAROLD D. LASSWELL, POLmCs: WHO GETS WHAT, WHEN, How
(1950).
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when, how" is much more susceptible to measurement and verification than, let us say, the characteristics of the best regime.
A second difficulty associated with the scientific study of politics is its adoption of an attitude of objectivity toward the objects of
its study. Political science seeks to explain political phenomena. To
give an impartial explanation of some phenomenon requires the scientist to assume a vantage point that is neutral, and this typically requires the scientist to stand outside-or to behave just as though
standing outside-the system he or she seeks to explain. There are
numerous difficulties in identifying and attempting to occupy such a
vantage point even in the physical sciences, but where the study of
politics is concerned there are reasons to think that the attempt itself
may be inappropriate given the nature of the subject. At the very
least, any explanation of politics from a point of view wholly external to the actual practice of politics is necessarily incomplete. As
JUrgen Habermas recently observed, "insofar as [social science] insists on an objectivating view from the outside, remaining insensitive
to the symbolic dimension whose meaning is only internally accessible, sociological perception falls into the ... danger of remaining
blind. 3 3 In other words, by remaining outside the system, observers
who seek to be objective and neutral deliberately blind themselves
both to the considerations that motivate people within the system to
meanings with which the actual participants invest
act, and to the
34
their actions.
This approach may make no difference in the study of the natural sciences. No one much cares what a gas molecule experiences in
a pressure chamber; it is the mass action of large numbers of molecules that interests us, and rightly so. Many would even agree that
the experience of living organisms in an ecosystem may rightly be
33. JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS
TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 66 (William Rehg trans.,
2d ed. 1996).
34. In his contribution to this symposium, Michael Fitts identifies another
cost of the objectivating viewpoint: a loss of faith among participants in the
political system. As Fitts points out, attempts to "explain" the workings of the
political system from an outsider's perspective may delegitimize it in the
minds of those who live and act within the system. See Michael Fitts, Confronting the Free Will Problem in Election Law Scholarship: The Hazards of
Legal Fine Tuning, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV.1121, 1129 (1999).
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ignored by scientists studying ecology, thus validating their adoption
of a vantage point outside the ecosystem. But where the political behavior of people is concerned, it is not nearly so clear that the objectivating standpoint is ethically defensible or even relevant to any useful understanding of human politics.
A concrete application of this criticism may illuminate the point.
Consider, for example, the so-called "black box" methodology of the
social sciences. This familiar heuristic allows social scientists essentially to bypass complex sub-processes in the systems they are
studying by bracketing those processes and thinking of them collectively as a single "black box," i.e., a device whose internal workings
are mysterious. Despite the opacity of the black box, the social scientist may not be thwarted in his effort to understand the system as a
whole since he is still able to observe the inputs to and outputs from
the black box. By carefully comparing inputs and outputs, the social
scientist may be able to construct a kind of second-best model of the
internal workings of the black box that does not purport accurately to
render its internal workings, but only mimics the operation of the
black box by reproducing its effect on inputs. The social scientist
has succeeded in this enterprise if his arbitrary substitute for the systems represented by the black box accurately reproduces the inputoutput relationship produced by the black box subsystem.
This is more or less the method by which political science attempts to predict voting behavior. The internal workings of the
voter's mind are opaque, a black box. Yet by examining some inputs
to the voting decision-age, race, gender, political affiliation, income, and place of residence, for example-and the voter's actual
votes, political scientists may construct a model that mimics, sometimes with great accuracy, the effect of the actual political thought
processes by which voters decide how to cast their ballots. But in so
doing, it is far from clear that political scientists have attended to the
right problem. It could well be that most of what is worth studying
about politics takes place inside the black box, the very thing the political scientist methodologically is required to ignore. John Stuart
Mill, for example, held that the primary justification for democracy
lies in the beneficial effects on the citizenry of active political
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participation. 35 From this point of view, political science's approach
to the study of voting behavior requires its practitioners to look in all
the wrong places at all the wrong phenomena. In the political science account, as Walter Berns has pungently observed:
[T]he "organism" (the voter) is subjected to the "stimulus"
of the campaign and his "response" is a vote, almost as if he
(or it) had no choice in the matter. But a human being is
not an inert object that moves only by being moved ....
Being a creature able to form opinions, the voter brings
along with the opinion the very faculty that enabled him to
form it in the first place[:] the uniquely human faculty to
form... political opinions.36
All of these difficulties with the scientific study of politics flow
from what is certainly its most basic feature: its goal. The goal of
political science is not merely to understand political behavior, but
37
through the identification of scientific laws of politics, to predict it.
Indeed, in the scientific study of any subject there is no meaningful
difference between understanding and prediction, for the ultimate
measure of the validity of any scientific knowledge is its ability to
predict-to know is to verify and to verify is to predict. Yet there
are extremely sound reasons to doubt that the desire to predict political behavior is a legitimate goal for the study of politics. Perhaps all
knowledge has intrinsic value, but the principal justification for scientific knowledge, and certainly the main reason our society holds it
in such high regard, lies in the fact that the power to make scientific
predictions confers upon scientists the power to manipulate the
things they study. The ability to predict the behavior of fluids allows
the engineer to manipulate air so as to make an airplane fly; the ability to predict the reactions of chemicals allows the chemist to manipulate those reactions in a human cell so as to cure disease. Yet
these are not the kinds of achievements that translate readily to the
arena of the social sciences. If the ability to predict political
35. See JOHN STUART MILL, Representative Government, in
UTILITARIANISM, LIBERTY & REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 278 (E.P. Dut-

ton & Co. 1969).
36. Walter Berns, Voting Studies, in ESSAYS ON THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF
POLITICS, supra note 11, at 41.

37. Seeid. at8.
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phenomena confers the ability to manipulate them, by whom shall
they be manipulated, and to what end? The very notion of manipulating political outcomes smacks of totalitarianism precisely because
it appears to deny, or at least to thwart, the belief in human agency
and collective self-determination that both underlies and legitimates
contemporary democratic practices.
It is useful here to compare political science with economics, the
social science cousin from which it has obtained most of its stock of
scientific concepts and methodology. Economics seeks to understand economic processes; it measures its success by its ability to
predict economic activity; and its predictive abilities are then put to
use by policy makers, openly and self-consciously, for the purpose of
manipulating economies to achieve certain goals. Yet there is a critical difference between manipulating an economy and manipulating a
political system.
In Western societies, there is widespread agreement that economic activity increases human welfare3 8 and that the purpose of
economic policy should be to makimize social welfare by increasing
net economic benefits. Because of this consensus, the manipulation
of economic activity is largely uncontroversial. The same cannot be
said of politics. There is simply no consensus anywhere concerning
the goals that polities should pursue or the means they should employ. Politics, indeed, may plausibly be understood as the very process by which polities decide upon their collective goals. To import
the tools and methods of economic analysis into the political realm
may thus mistakenly apply the tools and methods of scientific manipulation to an enterprise that must, if it is to be meaningful, remain
manipulation-free. This inappropriateness undoubtedly accounts for
the public cynicism attending the increasingly widespread use of
polling in contemporary politics. Polling is a powerful tool for predicting, and consequently for manipulating, political outcomes.
There is clearly something inauthentic about a type of politics in
which popular approval, as measured by polls and focus groups, is
treated as a precondition for the adoption of a position or the proposal of a policy, rather than the other way around.
38. Marxists, of course, might disagree, but after the fall of communism as
a viable system of political economy, it is doubtful that a contrary view prevails in any significant part of the western world.
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A related criticism leveled against the predictive aspirations of
the scientific study of politics is that the goal itself is utopian. As
Isaiah Berlin puts it, "[t]here is no natural science of politics any
more than a natural science of ethics. Natural science cannot answer
all questions." 39 In the realm of the natural sciences, Berlin observes:
[C]ertain laws and principles are recognized as having been
Those who deny or
established by proper methods ....
defy these laws or methods... are quite rightly regarded as
cranks or lunatics. But in ordinary life, and perhaps in
some of the humanities-studies such as history, or philosophy, or law. . . -those are Utopian who place excessive faith in laws and methods derived from alien fields,
mostly from the natural sciences, and apply them with great
confidence and somewhat mechanistically. . . . [B]ad
judgment here consist[s] not in failing to apply the methods
science, but, on the contrary, in overapplying
of natural
40
them.
In consequence, political science's goal is unrealistic; it attempts to
apply methods and kinds of knowledge to realms of human activity
within which they have only limited application.
Some critics have gone even further, claiming that political science's goal of predicting and manipulating political phenomena is
not merely inappropriate or pursued with excessive enthusiasm, but
impossible. Alasdair MacIntyre, for example, argues that the social
sciences rest on false premises, and that the entire enterprise is a pernicious pathology of liberalism. According to Maclntyre, one of the
Enlightenment's great failings was its abandonment of the concept of
a human telos, the idea that humans have goals and purposes which
are given to them by their social situation and which provide a
benchmark against which to make moral judgments about the behavior of individuals. 4 ' The expulsion of the concept of a telos, says
Macntyre, resulted in the divorce of fact from value, which in turn
gave rise to a view of the world in which human behavior can be understood as resulting from the operation of mechanisms the behavior
39. Berlin, supra note 18, at 49.
40. Id. at 51-52.
41. See ALAsDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE chs. 5-7 (2d ed. 1984).
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of which can be known and explained through the use of "lawlike
generalizations." 42 This belief in turn summoned to prominence a
quintessentially modem "character," the "bureaucratic manager" or
expert, who identifies and administers these laws of social control.43
The problem, Macntyre continues, is that the task of these bureaucratic managers is impossible. "What managerial expertise requires for its vindication," MacIntyre observes, "is a justified conception of social science as providing a stock of law-like
generalizations with strong predictive power." 44 Yet, "the salient
fact about those sciences is the absence of the discovery of any lawlike generalizations whatsoever."45 What social scientists do not understand, according to MacIntyre, is that human affairs are characterized by several kinds of "systematic unpredictability" that render
predictions of human behavior impossible. 46 MacIntyre argues ultimately that human behavior is unpredictable because each of us constantly strives to achieve two different and incompatible goals: the
attempt "to embody his own plans and projects in the natural and social world," on the one hand, and on the other, to retain some degree
of autonomy, which we express by attempting to remain "to some
degree opaque and unpredictable." 7 From this, however, MacIntyre
draws a conclusion that he considers salutary: social control is im48
possible---"[n]o one is or could be in charge."
This brings us to the final criticism often made of the scientific
study of politics: its lack of success. Interestingly, this argument is
made not only by critics standing outside the discipline who approach it from a philosophical or humanistic perspective, but by
many within political science itself. The criticism, moreover, becomes more pointed the more scientific political scientists aspire to
become. For example, Donald Green and Ian Shapiro, two highly
regarded political scientists, recently published a forceful critique of
rational choice theory. 49 Even accepting without challenge "rational
42. Id. at 82.
43. See id. at chs. 7-8.
44. Id. at 88.
45. Id.

46. See id. at 93.

47. Id. at 104 (emphasis omitted).

48. Id. at 107.

49. See generally GREEN & SHAPIRO, supra note 8.
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choice theorists' aspirations to study politics scientifically," 50 they
concluded that "exceedingly little has been learned" as a result of the
efforts of these theorists. 5 1 In a recent forum in PS, the in-house
journal of the American Political Science Association, one commentator took an even stronger view: "'The main problem is not that
much of the writing of academic intellectuals is too mathematical,
but that it is insignificant, unimportant, trivial.', 5 2 It is indeed curious that political science should choose to emulate economics and
the methods of economic analysis when the most advanced, scientific
their virtually comeconomic models are perhaps most notable for
53
phenomena.
economic
predict
to
inability
plete
III. THE DIVERSITY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE KNOWLEDGE
Although it may be impolite to look a gift horse in the mouth,
these criticisms suggest that actors within the legal system should
exercise some degree of caution before embracing and relying upon
political science knowledge that is offered for legal applications. But
what kind of caution should they exercise, and with respect to what
kinds of knowledge? Despite their apparent comprehensiveness, the
criticisms set out above can hardly be taken to mean that all political
science knowledge is not only suspect, but useless, and that political
science therefore has nothing at all to offer law. In the first place,
"political science" is by no means the monolithic discipline its critics
depict. Not every political scientist sits at a computer crunching
numbers or devising equations. Many political scientists continue to
study politics in the philosophical and humanistic traditions. Descriptive and comparative political science seem to be making
something of a return after a period of professional exile. The work
of some political scientists who study the institutions of American
government-the powers of the various branches, for example, or
50. Id. at ix.
51. Id. at x; but see THE RATIONAL CHOICE CONTROVERSY: ECONOMIC

MODELS OF POLITICS RECONSIDERED (Jeffrey Friedman ed., 1996).
52. Chalmers Johnson, Preconceptionvs. Observation, or the Contributions
of Rational Choice Theory andArea Studies to Contemporary Political Science, 30 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 170, (quoting MARTIN ANDERSON, IMPOSTERS
INTHE TEMPLE 101 (1992)).

53. For an amusing account, see Alan Ehrenhalt, Keepers of the Dismal
Faith,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1997, at E13.
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trends in the rulings or adjudicative practices of courts-is often hard
to distinguish from the work of their counterparts in the legal academy. This diversity of method and approach within the field of political science is significant, for it means that political scientists produce a broad variety of different kinds of knowledge. Not all of this
knowledge is vulnerable to the criticisms outlined above, and for that
reason a good deal of it may well prove useful to law. In light of this
diversity, it is probably more fruitful, and certainly more accurate, to
view the work of political scientists as falling along a spectrum from
the least to the most "scientific."
One extremely common kind of political science study that lies
toward the "unscientific" end of the spectrum, for example, is the
kind of study that seeks nothing more than to document rigorously,
or perhaps to disprove, some characteristic of the political world.
What are the main features of American systems of government, and
how frequently are they found? What are the historic patterns of political party registration? Do blacks and whites turn out to vote in
similar proportions? Do members of various ethnic and racial groups
tend to vote for candidates with certain kinds of attributes? How often do voters initiate contacts with elected officials? How frequently
and in what ways do lobbyists actually gain access to politicians?
Political scientists often mount studies the principal object of which
is simply to gather sufficient data to provide answers to these and
similar questions. In scientific terms, the political scientist who undertakes such studies is something like a field biologist who seeks to
observe, classify and quantify natural phenomena through direct observation.
While these kinds of studies certainly count as "political science," they are typically conceived in light of and framed around beliefs or suppositions that originate in the ordinary, everyday experience of politics by ordinary political actors. Both the subject matter
of the study and the conviction that the results will be of some use in
understanding political phenomena are supplied not by some kind of
professional expertise possessed by the political scientist, but by ordinary political experience. This kind of study, then, far from
dismissing what Strauss calls "pre-scientific knowledge," 54 is based
54. See Strauss, supra note 11, at 317.
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on and organized around just such knowledge. Indeed, as Strauss
concedes, "[n]o one in his senses ever dreamt that he could know
anything, say, of American government as such or of the present polooking at American government or
litical situation as such except by 55
situation."
political
at the present
The results of these studies, moreover, might equally be characterized as pre-scientific. Although such studies may gather relevant
data by sophisticated means that are not readily available to the nonspecialist, or from sources that are known only to political science
professionals, the kind of knowledge these studies produce is in principle accessible to anyone with an adequate background understanding of the political phenomena under study-even if that understanding derives from direct experience of the political world rather
than from professional training. The professional expertise of the
political scientist here consists primarily in applying professional
tools and methods to the investigation of a problem that is given,
framed, and interpreted by ordinary political understandings.
A second common kind of political science study with somewhat more scientific aspirations seeks not merely to investigate observable political phenomena, but through the application of scientific expertise to reveal facts and relationships about the political
world that might otherwise remain hidden. A good example of this
kind of project is Maurice Duverger's study of the relationship between electoral systems and parties, a study that yielded what is often
called Duverger's Law. According to Duverger's Law, simplemajority, single-ballot electoral systems tend to result in two-party
systems, whereas systems of proportional representation tend to produce multipartyism. 56 Another example is Douglas Rae's nowclassic study showing, among other things, the ways in which different electoral systems overreward political success, and the declining
improvements in proportionality associated with increasing the size
of election districts in proportional systems.5 7 Studies such as these
55. Id. at 314.
56. See William H. Riker, Duverger'sLaw Revisited, in ELECTORAL LAWS
AND THEIR POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 19 (Bernard Grofman & Arend Li-

jphart eds., 1986).
57. See generally DOUGLAS W. RAE, THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF
ELECTORAL LAWS (1971).
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are based on and inspired by real-world observations of political
phenomena, but go beyond mere documentation or classification to
hypothesize causal mechanisms and relationships that are hidden
from plain-that is to say, pre-scientific-view. The professional
expertise of the political scientist in this situation consists in using
scientific tools to discover and explain these hidden relationships,
thereby increasing our understanding of the operation of the political
world. In this respect, the political scientist functions something like
the chemist who investigates chemical reactions at the molecular
level, or the meteorologist who studies the relationships between atmospheric conditions and weather phenomena. These kinds of projects are clearly more scientific than the data-collecting variety not
only because they purport to reveal truths unavailable to ordinary experience, but also because they postulate relationships that may be
verified by prediction. One may infer Duverger's Law from observations, but one tests it by evaluating its power accurately to predict
the results of changes in the political environment. Duverger's Law
thus predicts that a change in some jurisdiction from first-past-thepost to proportional representation will cause an increase in the number of political parties; if that does not occur, the principles and explanations embodied in the rule become suspect.
The kinds of political science studies that most aspire to be scientific include studies employing the tools and methods of rational
choice theory, public choice theory, game theory, and so on. They
are characterized by the use of sophisticated tools of mathematics
and formal logic employed in the attempt to develop models of political phenomena that are as complete and as self-contained as possible. Studies of this type take a significant step beyond the kind of
discovery of hidden relationships just mentioned. These studies aspire to discover hidden relationships and to predict phenomena, but
they seek to do so not through step-by-step investigation and discovery, but by examining the characteristics of a fully abstracted, comprehensive, rigorously scientific description of the phenomenon under study. Once such a model is developed and validated, the
political scientist has no need to examine the modeled political phenomenon in its real-world setting; manipulation of the model tells the
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political scientist everything he or she needs to know." Here, the
political scientist functions more like a theoretical physicist, describing a set of phenomena that cannot be experienced other than
scientifically simply because the mathematical and logical relationships that describe the phenomena are not themselves susceptible to
any kind of pre-scientific experience. Like sub-atomic particles that
obey certain scientific laws without any awareness of them, political
actors cannot be aware of the laws that describe their behavior precisely because such laws are invisible to participants; they become
visible only through adoption of the scientific standpoint, which is
objective, neutral, and outside the activity observed.
In light of the sheer diversity of knowledge that political scientists produce, there seems to be no valid reason for law categorically
to reject all political science knowledge, and indeed it has not done
so: the law in many instances routinely deems at least some kinds of
political science knowledge to be relevant to the solution of legal
problems. The work of political scientists is indispensable to the
success of any claim of racial vote dilution or retrogression under the
Voting Rights Act. 59 Political scientists play integral roles in
mounting any apportionment claim premised on the violation of the
one-person-one-vote principle, and they often assist trial courts directly in crafting reapportionment plans to remedy identified constitutional defects. Political scientists have been tapped by courts
seeking to determine the constitutionally relevant impacts of state
laws regulating party endorsements and cross-endorsements of candidates. In short, the law already recognizes certain kinds of political
science knowledge as pertinent and helpful to the legal enterprise.
None of this is to say that law may accept and willy-nilly rely upon
all political science knowledge of every kind and in every context.
Instead, the real problem seems to involve distinguishing political
science knowledge which is useful to law from that which is not.

58. One of Green and Shapiro's criticisms of rational choice theory is that
its practitioners seem far more interested in developing such models than in
subjecting them to empirical tests of their validity. See GREEN & SHAPIRO,
supra note 8, at 42-46.
59. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1973.
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IV. POLITICAL SCIENCE AND THE IDENTIFICATION OF NORM
VALIDATING CONDITIONS

If some kinds of political science knowledge must be treated
skeptically while other kinds of knowledge are useful to the legal
enterprise, how may practitioners and students of election law tell
them apart? The answer requires attention to two characteristics of
law, one obvious and the other less so. First, law is an enterprise that
deals primarily with norms. Some of the most commonplace legal
activities involve identifying appropriate norms to guide social activities, determining the means by which those norms may best be
achieved, and applying appropriate norms in diverse situations. If
political science is to be of much use to law, it must be useful in the
pursuit of norms generated by the legal system for legal ends rather
than in the pursuit of norms generated by political science for scientific ends.
This condition seems, at first glance, to play directly to political
science's greatest strength. After all, the scientific study of politics
typically proceeds from the premise that the scientist is neutral and is
therefore neither a generator of norms nor an evaluator of norms on
their merits. Political science thus expressly disclaims any role in the
one area that law must insist upon reserving to itself. Although this
disjunction means that law and political science frequently will not
speak to each other directly, it also means that political science is in
an important sense well-suited to the role of helping law. Law supplies the norms and thus defines the parameters of the scientific
analysis; political science then investigates the manifestation of these
norms in political phenomena. Each discipline's strength matches
exactly the other's weakness, creating a useful partnership.
This analysis is correct as far as it goes, and it goes a long way
indeed. These factors well suit political science to address questions
concerning whether norms selected by the legal system have been
achieved, for example, or the means by which such norms may most
effectively be pursued. Probably the most common legal use of political science thus involves the proof of legally relevant facts. For
example, to use an illustration alluded to earlier, section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act establishes a norm prohibiting racial vote dilution.
The Supreme Court has ruled that the existence of racial bloc voting
is a fact that, in conjunction with other facts, serves to demonstrate a
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violation of the controlling statutory norm. Political science is useful
to law in this context if it is capable of assisting legal actors to establish the existence of this fact. Of course political science is particularly well equipped to determine the presence of bloc voting, and to
do so in a way the law accepts as valid. Similarly, the Equal Protection Clause establishes a norm requiring that each person's vote be
given equal weight, and the Supreme Court construes this to require
that election districts contain, as nearly as possible, equal numbers of
voters. 60 Political science is clearly of great use to law in this situation because its practitioners have tools that allow them readily to
provide the necessary numerical data not only for existing apportionment plans but also for hypothetical plans proposed for jurisdictions found to be in violation of the one-person-one-vote norm. Political science may also be useful to law in helping legal regulators
achieve a desired result. For example, legislators may wish to enact
legislation that will increase voter turnout, minimize quid pro quo
corruption of candidates for political office, or increase minority representation on legislative bodies. Much political science work is devoted to exploring the relationships among different kinds of political phenomena, and such work may be precisely what is called for in
identifying the most effective means to achieve legislatively determined ends.
This brings us to the second, less obvious characteristic of the
legal enterprise. Law does more than merely specify norms to be
achieved. It also specifies the factual circumstances and conditions
that count as achievement of those norms. This is in a sense the very
essence of law; it is what distinguishes law from philosophy or other
disciplines that deal with norms but whose conventions may permit
norms to be addressed exclusively at a very abstract level. The law
has no such luxury. Its business is to apply norms in the often complex and messy conditions of real life. This is the very characteristic
that makes law difficult, but it is also the source of law's power-the
same power that makes law attractive to practitioners of other academic disciplines such as political science.

60. See Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 324-25 (1973); Kirkpatrick v.
Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 531 (1969).
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Political science is useful in the situations mentioned above,
then, not merely because it is in each of those situations employing a
norm supplied by law. In each of those situations, political science
also employs and adheres to a legally generated definition of the
facts and circumstances that count as achievement-or violation-of
the controlling norm. For example, if political science is to be of use
to law in determining whether a certain piece of legislation will increase voter turnout, it must do more than accept the legal norm providing that increasing voter turnout is a desirable end. It must also
adopt the law's definition of what would count as an increase in
voter turnout. If political scientists assess the impact of a piece of
legislation on voter turnout using an understanding of voter turnout
that differs from the law's, their results wili be of little use to legislators. Political science, then, is useful to law when the factual circumstances and conditions that count as achievement of a legal norm
are supplied by that norm itself.61 It follows, of course, that political
science's usefulness to law decreases dramatically whenever the
conditions that are to count as satisfaction of some legal norm are
supplied not by the norm, but by the political science analysis. Here
is where the danger to law arises, and it is a significant danger because just this happens all too frequently in political science analysis.
For reasons that have nothing to do with the norms under study, and
everything to do with political science methodology, political science
often disregards definitions of norm-satisfaction generated by firstorder normative enterprises, such as law, and substitutes definitions
of its own devising. 62
61. I do not mean to imply that law must necessarily treat political science
instrumentally, or that the two disciplines are incapable of engaging one another on a normative level. It is possible, for example, that political science's
demonstration of the widespread non-satisfaction of a legal norm could lead
law to question and rethink the norm. It may also be possible for political science to go a step further by engaging law in a normative dialogue at the most
fundamental levels. See generally W.T. MURPHY, THE OLDEST SOCIAL
SCIENCE? CONFIGURATIONS OF LAW AND MODERNITY (1997) (discussing the
role of law in society); Francis J. Mootz III, Desperately Seeking Science, 73
WASH. U. L.Q. 1009, 1010-18 (1995) (distinguishing between genuine interdisciplinary encounters and "mutual intellectual colonization").
62. In Bruce Cain's account, this does not happen very often in the election
law area. Cain views law as having set the agenda for political science research on some of the major questions in election law. See Bruce Cain, Elec-
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Very often, the norms that the law seeks to apply in political
matters, and the questions that the law contemplates regarding these
norms, are not readily framed in terms susceptible to political science
analysis. The law, for example, may wish to construct a political
system that makes people happy, or it may wish to take actions designed to assure that people become good citizens. Political science
is not well-suited to assess phenomena such as happiness or good
citizenship because they are not readily susceptible to measurement
by its tools. Often, however, difficulty in measuring phenomena will
not dissuade political scientists from making the attempt. Since they
cannot measure the phenomenon as defined by law, however, political scientists must redefine it in other, more easily measured terms.
Suppose, for example, that legal actors wish to know whether
Americans as a group are good citizens, and that the law defines the
good citizen as one who is interested in and participates in politics.
Neither of these terms is readily susceptible to measurement, the first
because it is largely subjective and the second because the forms that
political participation may take are extraordinarily diverse and difficult to verify. A quintessential political science move would be to
redefine good citizenship as consisting in, say, the regular reading of
a newspaper and regular voting. 63 Having thus reframed in empirically measurable terms the factual circumstances that count as
achievement of the good citizenship norm, the political scientist may
then proceed to use the tools of political science to evaluate whether
the norm of good citizenship has been achieved by existing political
institutions. It does not necessarily follow, however, that the political scientist's results demonstrate anything significant about the
norm under study; all political science shows in this situation-all it
can ever show-is achievement or nonachievement of the proxy
measure that the political scientist has chosen to stand in for the
norm's own validating conditions. This is precisely what Berns
tion Law as a Field: A PoliticalScientist's Perspective, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1105, 1107-14 (1999). He concedes more of an impact to political science in
other areas such as campaign finance and corruption, but apparently only because he assigns democratic theory to the domain of political science rather
than to law. See id. at 1114-18. Apparently Cain seems to view law narrowly
as consisting of "litigation and court intervention." Id. at 1120.

63. For a recent example of this approach see SIDNEY VERBA ET AL., VOICE
AND EQUALITY: CIVIC VOLUNTARISM INAMERICAN POLITICS 37-48 (1995).
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meant when he referred64to "the sacrifice of political relevance on the
altar of methodology."
Certainly the great exemplar of this defect in the annals of conrtemporary political science is Arrow's Impossibility Theorem.6
row's Theorem demonstrates that in certain circumstances voter
preferences among multiple alternatives may "cycle." 66 This means
that at any given moment it may be true of every alternative that
some majority of voters prefers it to a second alternative, but also
67
that a different majority of voters prefers a third alternative more.
Arrow's finding is commonly understood to mean that the concept of
a majority will is incoherent because the majority wills no single
thing; instead, different majorities simultaneously will different and
conflicting things. 68 Alternatively, Arrow's Theorem is often understood to show that real power in apparently democratic decisionmaking systems is held not by a majority of voters, but by whatever
individual or group is capable of manipulating the agenda by which
choices are brought to and framed for the electorate. 69 Since a majority might be found for many different alternatives, whoever wields
the power to set the agenda possesses in functional terms the power
to decide the outcome. It matters little which of these accounts one
prefers; both purport to lead to the same conclusion: democracy itself is impossible.
Now what is one to make of this conclusion-particularly one
who works within the American legal system, a system that not only
presumes but depends for its very legitimacy upon the possibility of
democracy and its coordinate doctrines, majority rule and democratic
self-government-a system whose adherents believe firmly in all the
concepts that Arrow's Theorem is said to disprove? These dire interpretations of Arrow's paradox are strongly reminiscent of a similar challenge to common understandings posed long ago by Zeno. In

64. Walter Berns, Voting Studies, in ESSAYS ON THE SCIENTIFIC

STUDY

OF

POLITICS, supra note 11, at 55.

65. See ARROW, supra note 9, at 2-3.
66. See Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at

Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, andDemocraticPolitics,
90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121, 2129 (1990).
67. See id.
68. See id. at 2135-36.

69. See id. at 2136-37.
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one of Zeno's famous paradoxes, a tortoise challenges Achilles to a
footrace. Because Achilles is much faster, the tortoise is granted a
head start. Zeno "proves," however, that no matter how fast Achilles
runs, he can never catch the tortoise. He reasons as follows. When
Achilles begins to run, the tortoise is at a certain point ahead of
Achilles. By the time Achilles reaches that point, the tortoise has
moved ahead to a second position, still ahead of Achilles. By the
time Achilles reaches that second position, the tortoise has again
moved ahead. By the time Achilles reaches that point, the tortoise,
no matter how slow, has again proceeded ahead. Because Achilles
must always reach the point formerly occupied by the tortoisevoila!-he can never catch up to it.70 What makes this a paradox, of
course, is that everybody knows that Achilles is perfectly capable of
passing the tortoise. There is nothing wrong with Zeno's reasoning,
on the other hand. The difficulty lies elsewhere, in his definition of
the problem. It was not until the invention of the concept of the
limit, and with it the calculus, that mathematicians came to understand how to reframe the problem of Achilles and the tortoise to describe it in ways that comport
more closely with experience and thus
71
to dissolve the paradox.
Arrow's paradox is similar to Zeno's in many ways. Elections
involve cycling, cycling means there is no unique, coherent majority
will, and-voila!--democracy cannot exist. Yet it certainly seems as
though democracy exists, if not all the time then on a great many occasions, both important and obscure. This paradox arises because
political science here purports to assess the existence of a norm by
investigating a set of norm-validating conditions that are defined for
their ease of measurement, and consequently for the convenience of
the political scientist, rather than by the norm under study or by the
enterprise that generated the norm in the first place. Arrow's conclusions can have legal relevance only if Arrow uses a legally relevant
definition of what counts as democracy. Yet it is clear that the Theorem defines democracy in a highly reductive and oversimplified
manner. Arrow's Theorem is capable of impugning democracy only
70. See generally R.M. SAINSBURY, PARADOXES 5-6 (1988) (reciting an
account of this famous paradox).
71. See A.W. MOORE, THE INFINITE 71-74 (1990); ADOLF GRuNBAUM,
MODERN SCIENCE AND ZENO'S PARADOXES 100-09 (1967).
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if democracy exists solely when every collective decision is made in
accordance with a unique majority will that is determined solely by
the aggregation of individual preferences as expressed in single-issue
balloting, in a decision presenting exactly two alternatives, where
those preferences are expressed in ways that do not take into account
the intensity of voter preferences. 72 Although these characteristics
are not irrelevant to any modem conception of democratic selfgovernment, they hardly exhaust it. The conception of democracy
implicitly embodied in Arrow's Theorem is one that focuses heavily,
indeed exclusively, on ultimate decisions. Yet some conceptions of
democracy, such as developmental democracy and deliberative democracy, place comparatively little emphasis on the actual decisionmaking apparatus of democratic institutions. In these theories, democracy is much more about the process preceding the decision itself, and democracy's real significance lies in the way that the polity
confronts challenges that demand
a decision rather than in the deci73
sional outcomes themselves.
Many other conceptions of democracy place some stock in the
outcomes of decision-making processes, but their perspective takes
in much more than the mere aggregation of votes in individual balloting decisions. These theories employ broad concepts of popular
sovereignty, for example, or invoke complex relationships of representation. Many theories of popular sovereignty, including the theory embodied in the United States Constitution, require only retro74
spective popular acceptance of official action to confer legitimacy.
Clearly, Arrow's Theorem is rendered irrelevant to the extent that
democratic self-government is legitimated by contemporaneous or
retrospective popular acceptance of official actions rather than by
technical compliance with the Theorem's formal criteria of majority
rule. Because the law need not and does not define democracy in the
neatly measurable terms in which Arrow's Theorem defines it, the
Theorem's conclusions are of extremely limited relevance to the
72. For a related, though more sympathetic critique of Arrow's Theorem,
see JERRY L. MAsHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC
CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 41-44 (1997).

73. See James A. Gardner, Shut Up and Vote: A Critique of Deliberative
Democracy andthe Life of Talk, 63 TENN. L. REV. 421 (1996).
74. See U.S. CONST. arts. V, VII.

June 1999]

STOP ME BEFOREI QUANTIFYAGAIN

1167

legal enterprise. Just as Achilles could respond to Zeno's theorem by
overtaking the tortoise, so may law respond to Arrow's Theorem
with a performative refutation of its own: "You say democracy is
impossible? Watch this."
V. SKEPTICISM IN ELECTION LAW APPLIED

I want to conclude with an example of how practitioners and
students of election law might apply the kind of skepticism I have
described to their own use of political science. At the risk of biting
the hand that feeds me-it was Professor Rick Hasen who very generously invited me to participate in this Symposium-I shall take as
my example a recent article by Professor Hasen in which he uses
some of the tools and methods of political science to examine the
feasibility of compulsory voting legislation. 75 The problem Professor Hasen addresses in his article is the problem of low voter turnout
in the United States, and his goal is to assess whether legislation
making voting compulsory would solve this very important prob76
lem.
At the outset, however, we are met with a critical question:
what exactly is the "problem" with low voter turnout? To ask this
question in a legal context is immediately to invite a host of possible
replies. To a Lockean, low voter turnout might be problematic because it could indicate dwindling popular consent to existing forms
of government, thereby threatening the legitimacy of the regime. 7
To a Millian, low voter turnout is worrisome because it contributes to
a general deterioration in citizenship skills and impedes the personal
development of citizens as human beings. 78 To an Aristotelian, low
voter turnout might show a lack of appropriate virtue in the citizenry. 79 To a communitarian, low voter turnout might undermine the
community's sense of joint purpose, indicating an unhealthy preoccupation with private conduct that might threaten the community's
75. See Richard L. Hasen, Voting Without Law?, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2135

(1996).
76. See id. at 2136-38.
77. See JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT, 54-

72 (Prometheus Books, 1986).
78. See MILL, supra note 35.
79. See ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS (T.A. Sinclair trans., Penguin Books
1962).
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coherence and continuing development. The law not only easily accommodates any of these points of view, but also provides a forum
in which the nature of the problem may be thoroughly debated by
those who wish to address it. This kind of discussion is a vitally
necessary precondition to any consideration of legislative solutions
because no problem can be meaningfully solved until it has been
adequately defined. A compulsory voting law backed by sufficiently
harsh sanctions might well increase turnout, but it will certainly accomplish nothing of any use-it will not address the underlying
problem-if people do not vote because, say, they feel alienated
from a government they consider oppressively harsh and of dubious
legitimacy. In such circumstances a compulsory voting law would
only exacerbate the very problem in need of solution.
Because Professor Hasen chooses to view the problem from the
perspective of political science, these kinds of considerations rate at
most a sentence here or there in his article. 80 This should come as no
surprise. Political science, as we have seen, cannot readily process
normative concepts such as legitimacy, personal development, virtue,
or community-it cannot readily confront, that is to say, the ends to
which voter turnout is merely a means. Political science needs objects that are measurable, and voter turnout itself certainly fits the
bill. Consequently, political science frames its analysis of compulsory voting laws not by asking whether such laws would solve the
problem of which low voter turnout is a symptom, but rather by
asking simply whether such laws would increase turnout. This is a
very different question.
Now, I do not wish to be misunderstood. The question political
science poses is undeniably relevant, and if political science can shed
light on the ability of compulsory voting laws to increase voter turnout it will contribute something to the deliberations of a legislature
contemplating the enactment of such laws. But this information is
useful only if the legislature has already determined that increasing
voter turnout by means of a compulsory voting law is a way of

80. See generally Hasen, supra note 75, at 2154 ("decreasing social connectedness"); see id. at 2165 ("legitimating democratic government"); see id.
at 2168 (people "follow the law because they believe that following the law
itself is right"); see id. at 2174 ("poorer decisionmaking").
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solving the problem posed by low voter turnout. On this question,
political science, in Professor Hasen's account, is silent.
The reasons for political science's silence on this question are
instructive. For the political scientist, the problem of low voter turnout is analyzed by reference to the so-called "paradox of voting.'
Political scientists regard voting as paradoxical because it cannot be
readily explained in traditional political science terms. If people are
rational utility-maximizers who decide what to do based on costbenefits analyses, then voting is irrational because the costs associated with voting, like collecting information, traveling to the polls,
and so on, however small, vastly exceed any benefit that an individual voter might reasonably expect to receive in consequence of an
electoral victory by the voter's preferred candidate. This reasoning
reveals the objectivating scientific viewpoint at work with a vengeance. To anyone other than a political scientist, there is nothing
paradoxical about voting. People vote, as Professor Hasen ultimately
reports,8 2 because voting is a duty of citizenship, because it is the
right thing to do, because it is a validating social practice.
Dimly aware that voting involves reasons like these, political
science reframes the analysis by hypothesizing the existence of
something called "norms ' 83 that through some mysterious process
"cause" people to vote. The task that political science sets for itself
is to "explain" how norms appear and how they impose their discipline on their adherents. Its explanation focuses on the conditions in
which "demand" for a norm might "arise" and on who might "benefit" from the norm.84 From a legal perspective, this is an awfully
strange way of speaking about the problem. Political science speaks
in these terms because, unable to measure and thus to comprehend
the internal workings of the voter turnout process, it must resort to
the methodology of the black box. Using that methodology, political
science brackets the voting process, creates a set of proxy variables,
and attempts to simulate the results. Putting aside the palpable distaste with which political science approaches these "norms"--they
are described in Professor Hasen's article the way a pathologist
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 2138-46.
See id. at 2168.
See id. at 2147-51.
Id. at 2148.
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might describe a growth and are displayed while held at arm's length
with rubber gloves and forceps-the black box method is of highly
questionable utility in this situation. By bracketing the internal
mechanisms of voter turnout, political science succeeds in reducing
the question to one of comparative empirical results: are "norms and
laws.., good substitutes for one another[?] ' ,8 5 In other words, are
compulsory voting laws, which get people to the polls for fear of official punishment, as good at causing people to vote as are voting
norms, which get people to the polls by producing in them a belief
that they ought to go? While this way of framing the question allows
the answer to be investigated through the kinds of measurements that
political science routinely undertakes, the refraining is accomplished
at a devastating price. The very aspects of the voting problem that
must be consulted to determine whether compulsory voting laws are
capable of increasing voter turnout in a way that is responsive to the
problem are deliberately effaced by bracketing them and stuffing
them into a black box, never to be examined further. In this particular case, then, the methodological imperatives of political science
cause it to reframe the problem in a way that greatly impairs, for law,
the utility of the answer.
My purpose in this analysis, let me reemphasize, is neither to
denigrate political science as a discipline nor to suggest that it has
nothing of value to offer law. Far from it. As Isaiah Berlin, no great
enthusiast of the application of social science methods to humanistic
pursuits, observed:
Of course, whatever can be isolated, looked at, inspected,
should be. We need not be obscurantist. I do not wish to
say or hint, as some romantic thinkers have, that something
is lost in the very act of investigating, analysing and bringing to light, that there is some virtue in darkness as such,
that the most important things are too deep for words, and
should be left untouched .... This I believe to be a false
and on the whole deleterious doctrine. Whatever can be illuminated, made articulate, incorporated in a proper science, should of course be so .... There are vast regions
of reality which only scientific methods, hypotheses,
85. Id. at2164.
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established truths, can reveal, account for, explain, and indeed control. What science can achieve must be welcomed.86
I could not agree more. Yet it is extremely important to the success
of all social enterprises that they be pursued in an appropriate way, in
reliance on appropriate kinds of knowledge and methods. Our society is impressed by science, and science's obvious and continuing
successes place constant pressure on other kinds of knowledge to enhance their popular authority by appearing scientific. The professional study of politics has succumbed to this pressure by remaking
itself in the scientific image. Law itself had a Langdellian flirtation
with science from which it is still recovering. Today, law must not
permit itself to be overly impressed by the scientific credentials of
the discipline of political science. Political science may have much
useful knowledge to offer law, but whenever it makes such an offer,
legal actors must keep their eyes fixed firmly on the goals of the legal enterprise. This in turn requires them to approach political science knowledge skeptically, and to evaluate the usefulness of such
knowledge case by case.

86. Berlin, supra note 18, at 48.
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